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Recovery is “the regaining of or possibility of regaining
something lost or taken away” or “restoration or return to
any former and better state or condition.”1 This is what we
need for the thousands of species we have battered and
exiled to the brink of extinction. Recovery is the heart and
soul of the Endangered Species Act2 (“ESA”) and the reason
for its enactment. If we look closely at the goals and
structure of the Act, we will find recovery’s primary support
in the provisions dealing with critical habitat designation3
and protection4—provisions that the implementing agencies
and many commentators have attempted to completely
write out of the statute. Their interpretation is wrong, and
while this reality is gradually gaining recognition, little is
being done to move closer to what Congress intended. There
has been little to no improvement in the problems plaguing
both designation of critical habitat and protection of that
which has been designated. It is time we took a closer look
at critical habitat in order to revive it, as it is an
endangered provision.
INTRODUCTION
The primary goal Congress expressed in the “Purposes”
subsection of the ESA was “to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved.”5 This is a reference to
habitat conservation, which is a key element of the Act.
Conservation biologists had already determined that
habitat loss is the single most important factor in species
extinction, and that habitat protection is essential to
recovery. This understanding and concern was the
foundation upon which Congress built the ESA.6 The terms
1. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1613 (2d ed. 2001).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311544 (2006).
3. Id. § 1533(a)(3).
4. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
5. Id. § 1531(b).
6. See 119 CONG. REC. 30,528 (1973) (statement of Rep. William Lehman)
(“The new law recognizes that the greatest threat to endangered animals has
been man’s destruction of their habitat.”); see also 119 CONG. REC. 30,162 (1973)
(statement of Rep. Leonor Sullivan) (“For the most part, the principal threat to
animals stems from the destruction of their habitat.”); 119 CONG. REC. 25,676
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“conservation” and “recovery” are used synonymously in the
ESA,7 so protecting habitat with an eye toward recovery for
atrisk species was clearly a key part of what Congress had
set out to accomplish. To that end, Congress tasked the
implementing agencies with designating critical habitat for
each species listed as “endangered” or “threatened” under
the Act,8 and then provided special protections for that
habitat.9 Unfortunately, nearly four decades later, critical
habitat has yet to become the recovery tool it was meant to
be.
There has been a great deal of confusion among courts,
agencies, developers, and environmental organizations
regarding the legal, environmental, and economic impacts of
designating critical habitat for species listed as threatened
or endangered under the ESA. Indeed, critical habitat has
been called “the front line” of the ESA battleground.10 At the
heart of this difficulty has been a need to understand the
degree to which the protections for critical habitat can be
distinguished from those for listed species generally.
Critical habitat is primarily protected in the context of
federal agencies consulting with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service to
determine whether a proposed federal action either
(1973) (statement of Sen. Theodore Stevens) (“One of the major causes of the
decline in wildlife populations is the destruction of their habitat.”).
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (“The terms ‘conserve,’ ‘conserving,’ and
‘conservation’ mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary.”).
8. Id. § 1533(a)(3) (“The Secretary, by regulation promulgated in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section and to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable—(i) shall, concurrently with making a determination under
paragraph (1) that a species is an endangered species or a threatened species,
designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical
habitat . . . .”).
9. See id. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring federal agencies to insure that their actions
do not adversely modify critical habitat).
10. Scott Norris, Only 30: A Portrait of the Endangered Species Act as a
Young Law, 54 BIOSCIENCE 288, 291 (2004); see also John G. Sidle, Critical
Habitat Designation: Is It Prudent?, 11 ENVTL. MGMT. 429, 429 (1987) (“Critical
habitat designation (CHD) for federally listed endangered and threatened
species in the United States is one of the most controversial and misunderstood
provisions of the Endangered Species Act . . . .”).
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jeopardizes a listed species or adversely modifies its
designated critical habitat.11 For most of ESA history these
agencies deemed the jeopardy standard and the adverse
modification standard to be identical (the “functional
equivalence policy”), such that critical habitat added no
further protection beyond listing.12 This understanding is
codified in the regulations defining jeopardy and adverse
modification.13 This perceived redundancy led them to
designate critical habitat quite rarely and protect that
which had been designated quite poorly.
Recent case law, however, has made adjustments to
both of these standards separately from one another, and
now the landscape is far more complex.14 On the critical
habitat side, this has come up in the context of a challenge
to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s method of analyzing the
economic impact of a particular critical habitat designation
(a factor required by the ESA), which depends heavily on
the relationship between these two protective standards. If
critical habitat indeed added no further protections to those
already enjoyed by listed species, what economic impact
could designation really have? The jeopardy standard tends
to be challenged in cases dealing with its direct application
during the consultation process, as does the critical habitat
standard, which is also raised in the context of failure to
designate. Because the two standards have been addressed
separately, and in a variety of contexts, there is little court
guidance on the relationship between the two.
Understanding this relationship is essential to
understanding critical habitat itself, as its value exists
entirely in relation to the protection from jeopardy that
listed species already enjoy. Commentators have argued
repeatedly, and the implementing agencies have agreed,
that critical habitat adds no value beyond listing,15 ignoring
11. Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of
such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Fantl, Not So Critical Designations: The Superfluous
Nature of Critical Habitat Designations Under the Endangered Species Act, 57
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the simple fact that Congress expressly provided for the
designation and protection of critical habitat, presumably
for a reason. It must serve a purpose, as it defies norms of
statutory interpretation to suggest that Congress would
require an agency to engage in a process that was to have
no impact at all. However, we will never be able to
understand this relationship, and thus the value of critical
habitat itself, until we clearly define both standards of
protection and think through Congress’ holistic plan.
The foundation of this article is to demonstrate, via
statutory interpretation and scientific support, that critical
habitat absolutely must add value beyond listing and that
this value is in the form of a greater focus on recovery of the
species. Ultimately, this article is a call to action. In
particular, I ask that the agencies recognize this reality, not
merely in the wake of lost litigation, but in a clearly defined
and permanent manner, as this is the only effective form of
recognition. I propose that the regulations setting the
consultation standards be redrafted to reflect this
distinction and that the method for designating critical
habitat be modified to reflect the new standards. Finally,
and perhaps most important, we absolutely must get caught
up with designating critical habitat for the species already
listed as threatened or endangered.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CRITICAL HABITAT
In order to discuss the issues most central to this
article, it is necessary first to provide the relevant statutory
and regulatory framework. The Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) provides a process for listing threatened and
endangered species.16 The decision whether to list a species
is to be based on several factors, one of which is “the present
or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its
habitat or range.”17 Thus, habitat concerns do play into the
ARK. L. REV. 143 (2004); Robert J. Scarpello, Statutory Redundancy: Why
Congress Should Overhaul the Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical
Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399 (2003) (arguing that we
should do away with critical habitat because it offers no additional protections
over listing but wastes time with litigation anyway); Shawn E. Smith, How
“Critical” is a Critical Habitat?: The United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s
Duty Under the Endangered Species Act, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 343 (1999).
16. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(c) (2006).
17. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A).
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listing decision itself, but as will be discussed further below,
this does not conflate listing with habitat designation.
Once listed, species receive protection in several forms.
The form most people are aware of is the prohibition against
“taking” individual members of a listed species,18 which is
an important route to protection from private parties.
However, it does far less to promote recovery than the form
of protection applicable to this article, which is the
requirement that all federal agencies “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . .
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of [designated critical]
habitat of such species.”19 In order to avoid jeopardy or
adverse modification, the action agency is required to
consult with the appropriate ESAimplementing agency
(either the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine
Fisheries Service, depending on the species, hereinafter
jointly referred to as “the Services”) any time an action
might affect a listed species.20 The consulting agency then
issues its opinion as to whether the action will jeopardize
the species or adversely modify its designated critical
habitat.21 This opinion is not binding, but it is guidance that
will be given weight in court should the action agency’s later
decisions be challenged.
A. Designation
The ESA requires that critical habitat be designated
“concurrently” with listing a species as threatened or
endangered, at least “to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable.”22 The “prudent and determinable” language
has been used as a source of discretion by the Services,
forcing the courts to define and limit the terms.23 One of the
18. See id. § 1538(a)(1).
19. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
20. See id.
21. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
22. Id. § 1533(a)(3).
23. See, e.g., Ala.Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250,
1263 (11th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434,
43839 (5th Cir. 2001).
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factors to consider in designating critical habitat is the
economic impact of doing so,24 though this factor is strictly
forbidden in making decisions regarding the listing of
species in the first place.25 This distinction is important to
understanding the arguments I make in Part II.B of this
article.
Critical habitat is defined as habitat which is “essential
to the conservation of the species.”26 As noted above, the
ESA defines “conservation” as synonymous with recovery, so
the combination of these two definitions makes clear that
critical habitat is that habitat which the species needs in
order to recover to the point of no longer being identifiable
as threatened or endangered.27 Although these two
definitions make it abundantly clear that the goal of critical
habitat is to recover the species to health, Congress took it a
step further and provided for the designation of critical
habitat that is no longer occupied by the species, but which
is also deemed “essential for the conservation of the
species.”28 The only conceivable reason to designate habitat
not currently occupied by the species as critical habitat is in
the hope that the species may use that habitat in order to
expand its occupation to what it once was (i.e., recovery).
So, in a nutshell, what we see thus far is that the ESA
requires the Services to list species as threatened or
endangered, and then adds to that listing the designation of
critical habitat. Listing and designation are the essential
labeling provisions that set the scene for later provisions
with actual teeth. The listings and designations are tools to
work with later in the Act, and Congress must have sought
to achieve something beyond what it could by working with
listing alone. The statutory definition of critical habitat
indicates that this something was recovery.

24. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
25. Id. 1533(b)(1)(A).
26. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I).
27. See id. § 1532(3) (“The terms ‘conserve,’ ‘conserving,’ and ‘conservation’
mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.”).
28. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
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B. Consultation
As noted above, federal agencies are not to take action
“likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification” of its critical habitat.29
This requirement is referred to as the “consultation
requirement” because action agencies must consult first
with one of the Services.30 The prohibition against jeopardy
is provided to a species simply because it is listed. Because
the very first factor considered in the decision to list a
species is “the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range,”31 it is
clear that a listed species can be jeopardized via harm to its
habitat.32 Indeed, harm to habitat is frequently at issue in
cases involving jeopardy.33
Nonetheless, Congress saw fit to set aside certain
habitats to be protected from any destruction or adverse
modification at all, not just that which rises to the level of
jeopardizing the continued existence of the species. Clearly,
something more was at stake here, or it would be
superfluous. Species were to be listed and protected from
actions, including habitat modification, which placed their
very existence in jeopardy. On top of that, certain habitat
was to be identified for the conservation (i.e., recovery) of
these species, and that habitat was to be more heavily
protected in order to be available for that purpose. In other
words, agencies cannot damage critical habitat, even if it
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the species,
as that habitat is there to promote conservation. Clearly,
this adds value for the species above listing alone.

29. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
30. See id.
31. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A).
32. Habitat modification can even rise to the level of qualifying as a “take”
under section nine. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. For a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995).
33. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Medina Cnty. Envtl.
Action Ass’n v. Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2010); Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010); Fla.
Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008).

2010]

REVIVING CRITICAL HABITAT

1103

The Services published regulations defining both the
jeopardy standard and the adverse modification standard,
for the purpose of responding to consultations on actions
proposed by other federal agencies.34 The key language in
both definitions (as still currently codified, in spite of court
decisions striking down portions of the language) is
identical for both standards. Adverse modification
“appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both
the survival and recovery of a listed species.”35 To jeopardize
is “to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival
and recovery of a listed species.”36
There are two issues with these definitions that are
relevant to my proposal. First, the use of the term “both”
before “survival and recovery” (as well as the “and”) takes
recovery completely out of the picture. Any action that
reduces the chances of survival reduces the chances of
recovery, but not vice versa. Actions that drastically reduce
the chances of recovery but not of survival would be
permitted under these definitions.37 Second, the substantive
terms in the definitions are identical, thus calling into
question the value of designating critical habitat at all (if
doing so adds no protections above being listed).38 As
discussed in the previous subsection, this simply cannot be.
The statute clearly envisions added protection via critical
habitat, specifically protection of the ability to recover to the
point of delisting.
C.

Importance

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he plain
intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost.”39 Recovery of struggling species is the goal, not merely
protecting the status quo. As a practical matter, however,
34. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of this problem, see Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the
Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game Protected Species Can’t Win, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 114, 13031 (2001).
38. See generally Scarpello, supra note 15, at 399403.
39. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
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there is only one provision in the ESA that lends itself to
any significant potential for recovery, and that is critical
habitat.40 The prohibition against “take” protects individuals
of a listed species from harm, which is more about survival.
Likewise, the jeopardy standard, albeit not purely about
survival (as I propose in Part IV, there is and should be
some concern for recovery in this analysis as well), is
primarily focused on “continued existence,” which does not
necessarily require full recovery to the point of delisting.
The only place in the ESA where the express goal of a
specific provision (as opposed to the general purposes stated
for the Act) is recovery to this point is critical habitat. It is
thus arguably the most important piece of the entire puzzle.
Destruction and/or adverse modification of habitat is
the leading danger to species in North America.41 Even with
the protection of critical habitat as weak as it has been
under the Services’ regulations, species with designated
critical habitat are more than twice as likely to improve
their status and less than half as likely to decline in
status.42 If the inadequately protected critical habitat can
make this much of a difference, it is not difficult to see how
significant the improvement could be with stronger
protection for critical habitat that focuses on recovery.
Species with designated critical habitat are also more likely
to have recovery plans created for them than the far more
numerous species without designated critical habitat.43 Also,
of all species with recovery plans, those with designated
critical habitat have greater task implementation than the
40. Second place goes to recovery planning. Recovery planning lacks the teeth
of critical habitat as its implementation is optional, whereas the language
relating to both designation and protection of critical habitat is mandatory. See
16 U.S.C. 1533(f) (2006).
41. Amy N. Hagen & Karen E. Hodges, Resolving Critical Habitat
Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy, and Biology, 20 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 399, 400 (2006).
42. Martin F. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A
Quantitative Analysis, 55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 362 (2005); see also J. Alan Clark et
al., Improving U.S. Endangered Species Act Recovery Plans: Key Findings and
Recommendations of the SCB Recovery Plan Project, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1510 (2002) (finding that species with designated critical habitat were less likely
to decline, more likely to remain stable, and more likely to improve).
43. Erik Harvey et al., Recovery Plan Revisions: Progress or Due Process?, 12
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 682, 688 (2002).
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rest.44 Moreover, public awareness of critical habitat areas
tends to result in greater general care efforts in these
areas.45
A road realignment proposal in Hawaii provided an
excellent example of how differently a species can be treated
simply because it has critical habitat. The project was to
take place within the critical habitat designated for the
Palila, leading the U.S. Army and the federal Department of
Transportation to propose $14 million in mitigation
projects.46 However, there were more than a dozen other
listed species in the project area, none of which had critical
habitat designations.47 No mitigation measures were
considered for these other listed species.48
Finally, a key advantage to critical habitat designation
is that it is the only provision in the entire ESA that
provides any protection for unoccupied habitat. It stands to
reason that a species that has diminished to the point of
listing under the ESA is going to occupy a smaller habitat
than it did when it was doing well. Naturally, if our goal is
to recover the species to its prior condition, it will be
necessary to protect some of its former habitat as well as
that which it currently occupies. That Congress
acknowledged this need is evident from the fact that it
provided for designation of unoccupied critical habitat. The
majority of species still do not have designated critical
habitat, and as such, nothing is being done to prevent the
complete development of their former habitat, which could
make it too late for recovery once the Services are
eventually forced to designate critical habitat for all.

44. Carolyn J. Lundquist et al., Factors Affecting Implementation of Recovery
Plans, 12 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 713 (2002).
45. See Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Envtl. and Pub.
Works, 108th Cong. 6166 (2003) (statement of John F. Kostyack, Senior
Counsel, National Wildlife Federation).
46. Hagen & Hodges, supra note 41, at 400.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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II. THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE THEORY AND ITS IMPACT
ON CRITICAL HABITAT
The Services, unfortunately, have not recognized the
distinction between the protections for listed species and
those for critical habitat.49 The Fish and Wildlife Service has
repeatedly expressed the view that critical habitat adds no
protection beyond what is already provided to listed species
via the jeopardy prohibition.50 Former Secretary of the
Interior (which houses the Fish and Wildlife Service) Bruce
Babbitt called critical habitat the least important provision
in the ESA, stating that “[y]ou could strike critical habitat
from the statute tomorrow and no one would miss it.”51
The big mistake was in drafting the defining
regulations to treat the two protective standards identically
in the first place, but the Services have used these
regulations to bootstrap this position ever since. The policy
position that critical habitat adds nothing to listing has
been informally known as the “functional equivalence”
policy. The idea is that the two protections (jeopardy and
adverse modification) serve identical functions for the
species and are thus redundant. This notion is contrary to
both science and congressional intent.
49. According to the Services, “interpretation of the regulations, by definition,
the adverse modification of critical habitat consultation is nearly identical to the
jeopardy consultation standard.” Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat
in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June 14,
1999).
50. In its most recent public information document explaining critical habitat
on its website, the Fish and Wildlife Service states:
In consultations for species with critical habitat, Federal agencies are
required to ensure that their activities do not destroy or adversely
modify critical habitat to the point that it will no longer aid in the
species’ recovery. In many cases, this level of protection is similar to
that already provided to species by the “jeopardy standard.” However,
areas that are currently unoccupied by the species, but are needed for
its recovery, are protected by the prohibition against destruction and
adverse modification of critical habitat.
Critical Habitat, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
(last
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/whatwedo//criticalhabitatsfaq.html
updated June 10, 2010). In other words, only unoccupied critical habitat
provides additional protection, as the jeopardy standard accomplishes the same
thing as the adverse modification standard in occupied areas. Id.
51. Norris, supra note 10, at 291.
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A. Designation Dearth
This situation led the Services to informally adopt a
policy of disinterest in designating critical habitat because
it was functionally equivalent to just being listed, and thus
not the best use of limited resources.52 Although the ESA
was amended in 1978 to make critical habitat designation
mandatory, the Fish and Wildlife Service has only rarely
done so, even since that time.53 As of September 20, 2010,
out of the 1959 species (1593 endangered and 366
threatened) that are listed as threatened or endangered
under the ESA,54 only 596 have critical habitat designated
for them.55 The Bush administration went so far as to
require the Services to place a disclaimer in every proposed
critical habitat designation, stating that “designation of
critical habitat provides little additional protection to
species.”56
52. See, for example, Sierra Club v U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d
434, 439 (5th Cir. 2001), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
described the following circumstance:
The 1998 critical habitat decision by the Services relied on the “not
prudent” exception to the ESA. The Services noted, first, that “[c]ritical
habitat, by definition, applies only to Federal agency actions.” They
observed that agencies would have to engage in “jeopardy consultation”
under the ESA where agency action could jeopardize the existence of a
listed species. The Services reasoned that virtually any federal action
that would adversely modify or destroy the Gulf sturgeon’s critical
habitat would also jeopardize the species’ existence and trigger
jeopardy consultation. Relying on the definitions of the
destruction/adverse modification and jeopardy standards in 50 C.F.R. §
402.02, the Services concluded that designation of critical habitat would
provide no additional benefit to the sturgeon beyond the protections
currently available through jeopardy consultation.
(internal citations omitted).
53. For a discussion of this practice, see generally Thomas F. Darin,
Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat
Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2000).
54. U.S.
Fish
&
Wildlife
Service
Species
Reports,
Summary
Listed
Species,
Listed
Populations
and
Recovery
Plans,
of
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/boxscore.jsp (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
55. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Species Reports, Listed Species with Critical
Habitat, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/CriticalHabitat.do?nmfs=1 (last visited
Sept. 20, 2010).
56. Hagen & Hodges, supra note 41, at 40001.
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The Services use their discretion under the “prudent
and determinable” language to support their inaction some
of the time, but often they simply don’t bother, and there is
nothing the resourcelimited wildlife advocates can do about
it with such a huge number of species at issue. The few that
can be challenged are frequently won by the advocates,
leading to a tiny handful of additional designations.57 This
drop in the bucket is not enough. Congress tasked the
agencies with designating critical habitat concurrently with
listing, and the tiny proportion of actual designations does
not come close to fulfilling this statutory duty.
B. Twisted Economic Analyses for Designations
Although the ESA forbids consideration of economic
impact during the listing process,58 it expressly includes it
for designating critical habitat.59 This, of course, makes it
necessary to assess the economic impact in order to take it
into account, thus creating room for a great deal of error
and/or disagreement. Economic analyses inherently invite
challenge because they appear clearcut but are actually
quite debatable. What formula do you use, and what figures
do you run through the formula? This has been an area of
great confusion and has caused more trouble than one
might expect given how little effort there has been to
resolve it.
The Fish and Wildlife Service carried its functional
equivalence philosophy into its economic analyses for the
critical habitat designations it did perform. Using what is
known as the “baseline method,” it placed all the existing
costs to landowners from the listing of the species into the
baseline, then only considered the additional costs of the
critical habitat designation, which was (thanks to the
functional equivalence policy) generally nothing. The use of
the baseline method was based both on the fact that the
ESA prohibited the consideration of economic impacts in
listing species, and (more importantly) on the fact that
57. See Norris, supra note 10, at 291.
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006) (listing decisions to be based solely on
scientific information). This just makes sense, as listing a species is simply a
factual statement that the species meets a certain level of vulnerability and not
a management action.
59. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
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these costs were not part of the cost of designating the
habitat. It was a reasonable exclusion of sunk costs, much
as one would do in almost any kind of economic evaluation,
but the combination of this method with functional
equivalence was a bit nonsensical, given that the cost was
always zero. Essentially, the formula was correct but the
data input was not.60
This process effectively resulted in no economic analysis
at all, writing yet another provision out of the statute.
Congress would not have required analysis of the economic
impact of designating critical habitat if it did not envision
that critical habitat would have a cost. This is additional
evidence of congressional intent that critical habitat would
contribute further protections for the species beyond listing
alone, as this is the only way for critical habitat designation
to have a cost. Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife Service
impliedly acknowledges this with its position that there is
no cost to consider because there is no added protection. We
cannot, however, pick and choose which parts of a statute to
implement. Critical habitat is in the statute, and Congress
expressed its expectation that it would have an economic
impact beyond listing (and thus that it would add further
protections for the species).
In 2001, after many years of the Fish and Wildlife
Service using this bizarre zerocost economic analysis for
designations, the Tenth Circuit rejected the baseline
approach for the very reason that it resulted in zero
economic costs (under the functional equivalence theory,
which was not itself challenged in that case) and thereby
rendered the ESA’s requirement to consider economic
impacts meaningless.61 The court in New Mexico Cattle
60. For a discussion of the baseline approach, see Cape Hatteras Access Pres.
Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 12930 (D.D.C. 2004)
(discussing the relationship between the functional equivalence doctrine and the
baseline approach to calculating the economic impact of critical habitat
designation).
61. N.M. Cattle Growers v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Because economic analysis done using the FWS’s baseline
model is rendered essentially without meaning by [the regulations defining
jeopardy and adverse modification identically], we conclude Congress intended
that the FWS conduct a full analysis of all of the economic impacts of a critical
habitat designation, regardless of whether those impacts are attributable co
extensively to other causes.”). An obvious flaw in this reasoning is that the court
states that because of a problem with the regulations, “Congress intended”
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Growers held that if the Fish and Wildlife Service could find
no additional cost from designating critical habitat, then it
must take the cost of listing out of the baseline and consider
that cost instead, because the statute requires an economic
impact analysis when designating critical habitat.62
This was a very odd result, in that it 1) rejected a
perfectly appropriate method of considering what costs the
designation added to a baseline of the economic impact of
the existing listing; and 2) forced the agency to decide how
much critical habitat to designate by considering the
economic impact of the listing, which had nothing to do with
the critical habitat designation. How should the agency
consider the economic impact of the designation, as required
by the statute, when the cost is the same whether it
designates one million acres or half that? If the cost of
listing is the only cost recognized, the figure will be the
same regardless of how much critical habitat is designated.
This cannot be the type of analysis that Congress
envisioned.
The approach after New Mexico Cattle Growers is
equally nonsensical to the approach before the case, with
the only difference being that the court required the
appearance of following the statute via some form of
economic analysis. But that is not what the statute
mandates—it requires consideration of the economic impact
of designating the critical habitat. The court even showed
some discomfort with its own result, but was in a bind as
there had been no challenge to the functional equivalence
theory itself.63 As a result, the wrong thing was struck
down. Instead of striking down the operating principle that
was contradictory to the Act, the case struck down a method

something, which is backward thinking, as Congress may have intended a world
with different regulations.
62. Id. at 128485.
63. See id. at 1283 (“The root of the problem lies in the FWS’s long held policy
position that CHDs are unhelpful, duplicative, and unnecessary. Between April
1996 and July 1999, more than 250 species had been listed pursuant to the ESA,
yet CHDs had been made for only two. Further, while we have held that making
a CHD is mandatory once a species is listed, the FWS has typically put off doing
so until forced to do so by court order.”) (internal citations omitted).
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of economic analysis (the baseline method) that is entirely
appropriate, as well as quite common among economists.64
The practical implications of this result were just as
horrible as its logic. Now that the Services were required to
consider the cost of listing in determining the economic
impact of designating critical habitat, that cost became far
more significant and weighed more heavily against the
benefit of designating the critical habitat, especially given
that the agency saw no benefit anyway. Not only did this
place the species’ needs at a disadvantage in the costbenefit
analysis for new designations, but it also resulted in
numerous challenges by developers to many prior
designations, because that critical habitat was costing them
money, but it had been designated after being deemed to
have no cost at all.65 The irony, of course, of this position is
the outright admission that critical habitat does impede
development (or they would not have standing) and
therefore does add protections that the jeopardy standard
alone would not provide. Perhaps there was just enough of a
mess here for them to have their cake and eat it too. In any
event, Congress did not mandate an actual costbenefit
analysis for designating critical habitat—rather, it allowed
the agencies to “take into account” economic impacts,66
which is quite different, and does not lend itself to striking
down designations for inadequate consideration of economic
impacts.67
64. See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 899, 936 (“[W]hile economic analysis works from a given baseline—usually
the status quo—and then asks whether changing that baseline improves things
overall, moral and political theorists focus on defining an acceptable baseline.”).
65. For a detailed discussion of postNew Mexico Cattle Growers costbenefit
analyses for critical habitat designations, see generally Amy Sinden, The
Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (2004).
66. This is clear from the legislative history, which states that “[t]he
Secretary is not required to give economics or any other ‘relevant impact’
predominant consideration in his specification of critical habitat.” H.R. Rep. No.
951625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467. Rather, “[t]he
consideration and weight given to any particular impact is completely within
the Secretary’s discretion.” Id.
67. See Sinden, supra note 65, at 19697 (arguing that Congress only
intended to give the agencies flexibility and not to require a costbenefit
analysis).
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C. Easy Breezy Consultation Results
The final sting of the functional equivalence policy is
the effect it has on the consultation process. Because critical
habitat is deemed to add no extra protection, everything
gets pulled together under a jeopardy standard. As
mentioned before, under the current68 regulations, adverse
modification “appreciably diminishes the value of critical
habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed
species,” much as jeopardy “reduce[s] appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species.”69 If a species’ very survival is not at stake, at least
as the regulations were drafted, we can do what we want to
critical habitat. And this is how it has been applied for the
many years that these regulations (and the corresponding
functional equivalence policy) were going strong. Sure
enough, protecting critical habitat with this standard—a
jeopardy standard, and a weak one at that—did not add
much protection beyond listing alone.70 It was a self
fulfilling prophecy, and so long as the Fish and Wildlife
Service followed its own regulations, never mind that the
whole system was contrary to the statute. Although this
problem has received some attention via litigation, real
change has yet to come.
III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM IN PIECEMEAL FASHION VIA
COURTS
The courts have begun to pick away at some of these
issues, and have done some good casebycase analysis, but
collectively these cases have actually muddied the waters
significantly. The various outcomes have generally
increased protections but decreased clarity as to how the
system should all work together. This is to be expected, as
we cannot develop legislation or regulation via court cases
dealing with only one issue and not addressing the whole.
Not one case has tackled the problematic functional
equivalence theory itself, which is at the heart of all the
68. “Current” in the sense that they have not been redrafted, though, as we
will see in the Part III, they have been heavily damaged by the courts.
69. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
70. At least not as much as it could—and should—have, though as discussed
above, it has made some difference even as it is.
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critical habitat implementation problems. In order to move
toward a consistent and logical system that is compatible
with the ESA, it is necessary for the Services to revise the
regulations. Judicial opinions have been striking down
elements of the regulations or their implementation, but
they cannot build a new system from scratch as is needed.
The two most important cases moving us in the right
direction can be found in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, both
of which have held that the critical habitat regulation
conflicts with the statute. In Gifford Pinchot Task Force v.
U.S Fish & Wildlife Service, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
regulatory definition of adverse modification to the extent
that the “both” language did away with any protection for
the goal of recovery, a goal that is clear from the statutory
definition of critical habitat.71 The court stated:
Because it is logical and inevitable that a species requires more
critical habitat for recovery than is necessary for the species
survival, the regulation’s singular focus becomes “survival.”
. . . The FWS could authorize the complete elimination of critical
habitat necessary only for recovery, and so long as the smaller
amount of critical habitat necessary for survival is not appreciably
diminished, then no “destruction or adverse modification,” as
defined by the regulation, has taken place. This cannot be right. If
the FWS follows its own regulation, then it is obligated to be
indifferent to, if not to ignore, the recovery goal of critical
habitat.72

Years earlier, in Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the very same
regulation, likewise because of the conservation goal behind
critical habitat.73 The court in Sierra Club was dealing with
a different context: the refusal to designate critical habitat
on the basis that it was not prudent because it added no
protection.74 The court held that the consultation regulation
defining destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat needed to protect it at a level sufficient to support
71. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
106970 (9th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 106970.
73. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 44142 (5th Cir.
2001).
74. Id. at 439.
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recovery, not just survival.75 Although this was a jab at the
functional equivalence policy, the case did not address it
headon, and, in any event, it persisted thereafter.
These cases may have brought some life back to critical
habitat’s recovery goal, but frankly little has changed. The
regulations remain unedited, listings continue to be
published without critical habitat designation, and
consultations continue to be a farce. Even if we consider
Gifford Pinchot Task Force to be the current state of the law
(as the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue), this
newly revived recovery element applied only to adverse
modification of critical habitat and not to jeopardy.76 Not
surprisingly, a handful of district courts have since begun
pointing out that New Mexico Cattle Growers is no longer
good law after Gifford Pinchot Task Force (now that critical
habitat protection has a higher recovery standard than
mere jeopardy of a listed species, though Gifford Pinchot
Task Force never said the jeopardy standard was fine as
is—it simply wasn’t at issue in the case), and have
resultantly held that the baseline method is indeed the most
appropriate way to consider economic costs.77 This is true
not only in light of the fact that consideration of the cost of
listing is not permitted, but more importantly because that
is the only way to determine the true cost of designating the
critical habitat.78
This string of cases may seem like a somewhat
straightforward process that is gradually working its way to
a clearly defined system (jeopardy considers only survival,
adverse modification considers recovery as well, and those
additional costs are the economic impact to consider when
75. Id. at 44143.
76. Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1059.
77. See, e.g., Fisher v. Salazar, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 137071 (N.D. Fla.
2009); Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1032
33 (D. Ariz. 2008); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 12930 (D.D.C. 2004).
78. See Sinden, supra note 65, at 163 (“[C]omparing the world with critical
habitat against the ‘baseline’ of a world without critical habitat is the only
sensible way to measure the impacts (economic or otherwise) of a designation.
An analysis that does otherwise—for example, an analysis that includes impacts
that are caused coextensively by listing and therefore would also exist in a
world without critical habitat—cannot serve the purpose Congress intended.”)
(footnote omitted).
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designating critical habitat), but the situation is not so
simple. In the midst of all this, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the practice of reading recovery out of the jeopardy
definition, noting (among other points) that the word
“recovery” was used in the regulation and thus must have
some meaning.79 Accordingly, the court held that the
Services must in fact consider impacts on recovery when
conducting a jeopardy analysis.80 The court in National
Wildlife Federation went as far as to liken its impact on the
jeopardy analysis to that of Gifford Pinchot Task Force on
adverse modification of critical habitat,81 thereby renewing
the potential for functional equivalence. Oddly, this opinion
was not mentioned in the more recent Fisher v. Salazar
decision (one of the district court opinions mentioned in the
last paragraph as treating Gifford Pinchot Task Force as
the end for New Mexico Cattle Growers), which based its
reasoning for returning to the baseline method on
distinguishing jeopardy from adverse modification in a
manner inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
National Wildlife Federation.82
Consequently, the entire system is in a state of
confusion. Does National Wildlife Federation bring back
functional equivalence, thereby reviving New Mexico Cattle
Growers and the bizarre method of considering the economic
impact of listing rather than of habitat designation? Or
should we go with the recent district court case, Fisher v.
Salazar, ignoring National Wildlife Federation and
maintaining the different levels of protection along with the
baseline method for calculating the economic impact of
designation? The former brings us recovery protection for
79. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 93132
(9th Cir. 2008). It is interesting to note that the reasoning in this Ninth Circuit
opinion is exactly the opposite of that used in its Gifford Pinchot Task Force
opinion. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). In Gifford Pinchot Task Force, the court observed the
regulatory language, “both survival and recovery,” and stated that it meant only
survival and was thus ignoring the recovery goal of critical habitat. Id. In
National Wildlife Federation, the court looked at this same language and stated
that regulation used the term recovery and thus must have a recovery element.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 93132.
80. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 93132
81. Id.
82. See Fisher, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
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both standards, but leads to a nonsensical process for
designation, and the latter provides a logical approach to
designation but leaves an inappropriately weak standard in
place for jeopardy analyses. In reality the situation is more
complicated than either of these approaches would suggest,
as the survival/recovery dichotomy is a false one, and goals
might exist in many places along the continuum in
between.83 This language is purely regulatory, and it has
caused a great deal of difficulty with implementing the
statute, which itself does suggest a difference between
jeopardy and adverse modification (adequate to allow for a
baseline method when analyzing the economic impact of
designating critical habitat), but not such a stark one.
IV. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE HOLISTICALLY AND MOVING
FORWARD SENSIBLY
A.

Congressional Intent

A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that we
must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which
implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of

83. There is evidence of a fleeting moment in time when some U.S. Federal
Wildlife Service staff recognized this, as we can see in the critical habitat
designation for northern spotted owls in 1992:
Section 7 prohibitions against the destruction or adverse modification
of critical habitat apply to actions that would impair survival and
recovery of the listed species, thus providing a regulatory means of
ensuring that Federal actions within critical habitat are considered in
relation to the goals and recommendations of a recovery plan. As a
result of the link between critical habitat and recovery, the prohibition
against destruction or adverse modification of the critical habitat
should provide for the protection of the critical habitat’s ability to
contribute fully to a species’ recovery. Thus, the adverse modification
standard may be reached closer to the recovery end of the survival
continuum, whereas, the jeopardy standard traditionally has been
applied nearer to the extinction end of the continuum.
Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg.
1796, 1822 (Jan. 15, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). This statement, as
we have seen above, is contradictory to nearly everything we’ve heard from the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service either before it or since. Indeed, it contains
concepts that the agency normally does not even seem to be aware of.
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the language it employed.”84 To say that critical habitat
protection is redundant to the existing protection against
jeopardy is to refuse to give effect to several clauses in the
statute. Congress expressly included the requirement that
critical habitat be designated concurrently with listing,85 so
it must add something beyond listing. Congress expressly
required that federal agencies refrain from destroying or
adversely modifying this habitat, once designated,86 and
because Congress told the Services what to look for in
designating critical habitat—areas of land “on which are
found those physical or biological features essential to the
conservation of the species”87—it provided a powerful
suggestion as to what it meant by adverse modification
(logically, harm to the features that led to the designation in
the first place).
These inclusions in the statute are enough on their own,
without resort to legislative history.88 However, the
legislative history supports the importance of critical
habitat as well, including impressive statements such as:
“the ultimate effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act
will depend on the designation of critical habitats.”89 Indeed,
84. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) (2006) provides in pertinent part:
(C) A final regulation designating critical habitat of an endangered
species or a threatened species shall be published concurrently with the
final regulation implementing the determination that such species is
endangered or threatened, unless the Secretary deems that—
....
(ii) critical habitat of such species is not then determinable, in which
case the Secretary, with respect to the proposed regulation to designate
such habitat, may extend the oneyear period specified in subparagraph
(A) by not more than one additional year, but not later than the close of
such additional year the Secretary must publish a final regulation,
based on such data as may be available at that time, designating, to the
maximum extent prudent, such habitat.
Id.
86. Id. 1536(a)(2).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
88. Saint Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm’r., 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“Where the language of the statute is plain, it is improper for this Court to
consult legislative history in determining congressional intent.” (citing United
States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491,495 (10th Cir. 1978))).
89. H.R. REP. NO. 94887, at 3 (1976).
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throughout the legislative history we find efforts to ensure
that the limited areas of discretion provided to the agencies
not be construed as diminishing the necessity of designating
critical habitat.90
Indeed, Congress even went so far as to amend the
statutory definition of critical habitat in 1978 to reject the
regulatory “survival and recovery” definition and give
critical habitat more strength. An appropriations bill from
the following year describes the 1978 amendments as
follows:
The term “critical habitat” was not defined in the 1973 Act, but
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act defined it to include
“air, land or water areas . . . the loss of which would appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed species
or a distinct segment of its population . . . .” The amendments
adopted during the 95th Congress significantly altered this
definition. The Act now defines “critical habitat” as “specific areas
. . . on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may
require special management consideration or protection.”91

In spite of the decades that the Services have spent
treating critical habitat as superfluous and thus
unnecessary, and in spite of the generations of leaders that
have accepted that interpretation, this issue is the easy one.
There is no question now that Congress intended more, and
this is gradually being recognized at all levels (though it has
90. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 951625, at 1617 (1978) (“The phrase ‘to the
maximum extent prudent’ is intended to give the Secretary the discretion to
decide not to designate critical habitat concurrently with the listing where it
would not be in the best interests of the species to do so. As an example, the
designation of critical habitat for some endangered plants may only encourage
individuals to collect these plants to the species’ ultimate detriment. The
committee intends that in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, designate
critical habitat at the same time that a species is listed as either endangered or
threatened. It is only in rare circumstances where the specification of critical
habitat concurrently with the listing would not be beneficial to the species.”); see
also Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Secretary may
only fail to designate a critical habitat under rare circumstances”); Northern
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (“This
legislative history leaves little room for doubt regarding the intent of Congress:
The designation of critical habitat is to coincide with the final listing decision
absent extraordinary circumstances.”).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 96167, at 56 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557,
256162 (emphases added).
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yet to be formally recognized or implemented). Critical
habitat must be protected to a degree adequate to promote
recovery.
The tougher question is what degree of protection we
provide via the jeopardy standard. Although this Article’s
focus is on how to move forward with critical habitat, the
jeopardy interpretation is essential to doing so, as the two
standards relate to one another in a very important way.
How do we calculate the economic impact of designating
critical habitat, as is required by the statute, without
knowing what to put in the baseline? The only way to
determine the cost of critical habitat is to determine what
protections it adds to listing alone.92 In order to propose new
regulations in a holistic manner we must interpret
congressional intent as to the jeopardy standard as well.
Moreover, until we sort out the relationship between the
two standards, the Services will not stepup their effort to
designate critical habitat.
An excellent starting point to our jeopardy inquiry can
be found in the work of Professor Daniel Rohlf, who set out
a decade ago to analyze the possible interpretations of
jeopardizing the “continued existence” of a species. He
stated:
On one hand, one could interpret this phrase to preclude only
activities that add to the risks faced by these species. If an action
pushes a species at least some degree closer to extinction, that
action clearly would render less likely the species’ existence over
time. Under this view, the implicit assumption is that the species
will continue to exist over time unless additional threats or
impacts push it closer to extinction. Thus, actions that do not
increase present risks to the species would not jeopardize that
species. Even actions that did increase these risks could be
interpreted as not necessarily not jeopardizing the species,
depending on how much of an increased risk of extinction they
created.
On the other hand, by definition listed species already face
serious threats to their continued existence, additional potential
impacts notwithstanding. Again by definition, these threats
persist for a given species until over time its status improves to
the point at which the Secretary changes it from its classification
92. I am assuming the use of the baseline method as that is the most logical
way to analyze the cost of an action, as well as the method proposed in this
article.
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as threatened or endangered. In this light, an increase in present
risks to the species’ very existence would not be the only possible
trigger for a jeopardy determination. One could also reasonably
interpret an action to jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species if the action precluded or even merely impaired the
species’ chances for eventual recovery. Put another way,
threatened and endangered species’ continued existence is in
doubt as long as they are listed; therefore, impacts that foreclose
or undermine a species’ chances of recovery perpetuate its atrisk
status and thus jeopardize its continued existence.93

The phrase “continued existence” is forwardlooking in
its terms. It may not invoke a sense of immediate proactive
recovery, but given that eventual recovery is important for
continued existence (as a listed, and thus not recovered,
species is always at risk of extinction), it would seem that
interference with eventual recovery would place continued
existence at greater risk. The difference between protecting
critical habitat from interference with its value to recovery
and protecting species from interference with their potential
for eventual recovery is not merely semantic. An action still
might take place outside of critical habitat that has the
effect of delaying recovery but not foreclosing it, which
would survive this jeopardy standard.
Indeed, this potentialforrecovery standard comports
with the language used in the existing Consultation
Handbook used by the Services, albeit not codified in the
regulations.94 The survival definition in the Consultation
Handbook, which has only been in place for about a decade,
marks a significant improvement over the typical
understanding of it as merely the avoidance of immediate
extinction. It states:
[T]he species’ persistence, as listed or as a recovery unit, beyond
the conditions leading to its endangerment, with sufficient
resilience to allow for the potential recovery from endangerment.
Said another way, survival is the condition in which a species
continues to exist into the future while retaining the potential for
recovery. This condition is characterized by a species with a
sufficient population, represented by all necessary age classes,
genetic heterogeneity, and number of sexually mature individuals
93. Rohlf, supra note 37, at 12627.
94. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT CONSULTATION HANDBOOK xvii (1998), available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm.
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producing viable offspring, which exists in an environment
providing all requirements for completion of the species’ entire life
cycle, including reproduction, sustenance, and shelter.95

This definition of survival places it closer to the middle
of the spectrum from mere survival (ordinary definition,
focused on the present) to recovery. It is possible that
actions can be proposed that will impede recovery (and thus
would not be permitted if on critical habitat under my
standard for that) but still not reach jeopardy under this
definition (as they do not foreclose future recovery and leave
in place the basic building blocks for that). I propose taking
a small step further than this definition. However, clearly
this standard protects far more than what has been
protected in actual practice, both before and since the
handbook was issued.96
If the Services were to follow this standard, it is
actually quite reasonable as a jeopardy standard, assuming
a species also has the appropriate recovery protection via
critical habitat and a recovery plan. This is key: Accepting a
jeopardy standard that is anything less than fullrecovery
focused requires proper implementation of the ESA as a
whole. No single ESA provision is adequate on its own. The
real action in the ESA is found in its recovery provisions:
critical habitat designation and recovery planning. These
are the proactive provisions of the ESA. The prohibitions
against jeopardy (applicable to federal agencies only) and
take (applicable to all) are the defensive provisions. It is like
the efforts we make to build our wealth as compared to the
things we do to protect ourselves from being robbed. We
need to do both. That said, there is a big difference between
getting your wallet swiped with a fresh ATM draw in it—
which hurts but does not significantly impact your future—
and having invested your retirement fund with Bernie
Madoff. There is only so much we can lose without seriously
risking our potential for recovery.
Congress clearly envisioned recovery efforts for all
listed species, and put in place provisions aimed at this
95. Id. at xviiiix
96. See, e.g., Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378
F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004); Cabinet Res. Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 465
F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Mont. 2006); Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 629 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
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goal.97 The jeopardy prohibition, referring to “continued
existence” even in the statute, does not appear to be a part
of the proactive recovery effort, but given the overall
conservation purpose of the statute, federal actions should,
at a minimum, not be permitted to significantly interfere
with the attainment of this goal. In order to create this
safeguard, we need to protect at the level described in the
Consultation Handbook, plus a little further, such that we
prohibit not only those actions which foreclose recovery, but
also those which significantly impede it. This is still less
than what is proposed here for critical habitat, which thus
maintains its value as the primary recovery zone.
Around the turn of the millennium the National Marine
Fisheries Service adopted an approach using similar logic
for jeopardy analyses of projects impacting anadromous
fish. The basic theory, and it is a sensible one, was that we
can interfere with recovery to a point that will reduce the
likelihood of survival, given that a listed species is less
likely to survive in its depressed state than should its status
be improved via recovery efforts.98 The Ninth Circuit upheld
this approach against challenge, but did not go so far as to
fully determine how jeopardy should be interpreted or
applied.99 This concept should be applied more broadly, as
well as codified, though we must take care to maintain the
distinction between this and the recovery value of critical
habitat or we render the latter meaningless.
Ultimately, if we are to draw clear distinctions for
implementation as well as stay true to congressional intent,
critical habitat is the land on which it is impermissible to
take any action that appreciably reduces its value to
97. But see J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 275, 288 (2009) (“The ESA, perhaps to the chagrin of its
most ardent supporters, is at bottom a harmpreventing law, not a benefit
mandating law. Causing take or jeopardy of species is prohibited, but promoting
the recovery of species is nowhere required by the statute.”). Even those in favor
of working toward recovery for listed species tend to view the ESA as
inadequate to the task. However, that is likely due to the fact that it has never
been fully implemented. Critical habitat designation is mandated by the statute,
and is to be selected as needed for recovery and then protected in order to
promote recovery, which, if it were actually followed, is quite proactive.
98. Rohlf, supra note 37, at 135.
99. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1161
62 (9th Cir. 1999).

2010]

REVIVING CRITICAL HABITAT

1123

recovery, regardless of whether the likelihood of recovery is
appreciably diminished thereby. On the other hand, actions
reducing the value of other land to recovery, but not thereby
significantly impeding recovery (perhaps due to the
existence of other land, including critical habitat), would
survive a jeopardy analysis. Such land has not been
designated as critical habitat and thus can be used freely so
long as doing so does not jeopardize the continued existence
of a listed species, including by significantly impeding its
recovery. Thus, critical habitat is protected by a far stricter
standard. Habitat modification is much more likely to be
allowed elsewhere.
B. Amending the Regulations Defining Jeopardy and
Adverse Modification
Regardless of where you stand politically with regard to
the degrees of protection that should be applied to jeopardy
and adverse modification, one thing is very clear: the
regulations are poorly drafted and need to be replaced. The
terms “survival” and “recovery” really do not belong
together at all in a welldrafted regulation. As this article
has already addressed throughout, using an “and” between
these terms writes recovery out of it and means the same
thing as the term “survival” would alone. That said, it
makes little sense to use the terms with an “or” between
them either, as this renders the term “survival” superfluous
(if you protect a species or its habitat at a level to promote
recovery, you do far more than protect its survival). Because
survival is implicit in recovery, if we focus on the latter
there is no need to refer to the former, which only serves to
cause confusion. Ultimately, the term “survival” should be
taken out of these regulations entirely.
That another decade has passed without any effort to
amend these regulations in light of their being repeatedly
struck down by the courts throughout that period is not only
unacceptable; it is a tragedy for the many listed species that
are not moving toward recovery under the status quo. The
Services have internally acknowledged the need to redraft
at least the critical habitat regulation,100 but have neither

100. See Memorandum from Marshall Jones, Acting Director, United States
Fish and Wildlife Service to Regional Directors, United States Fish and Wildlife
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done so nor acknowledged the need to redraft the jeopardy
standard in light of the obvious problems with the language,
also the subject of judicial criticism. In fact, they recently
published rulemaking amending section 402.02, the
definitions section of the consultation regulations in which
the problematic jeopardy and adverse modification language
is found, and did not include proposed amendments for
these portions.101 This, of course, raises the question as to
whether they will ever get around to it, so this article is
intended to give them a little push and some suggestions.
I propose the following language (or something like it)
for the new regulations, in order to provide as much
guidance as possible while still maintaining flexibility for
varying circumstances:
Destruction or adverse modification means a direct or
indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of
any portion of designated critical habitat for the recovery of
a listed species. Such alterations include, but are not
limited to, alterations adversely modifying any of those
physical or biological features that were the basis for
determining the habitat to be critical.
“Jeopardize the continued existence of” means to engage
in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or
indirectly, to significantly reduce the likelihood of eventual
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.
By using the terms “significantly” and “eventual,” the
jeopardy definition does not go as far as that for critical
habitat, leaving the proactive recovery effort to take place
on designated critical habitat, where Congress intended.
Still, it includes implicitly the former protection of survival
and goes a bit further by not letting actions outside of
critical habitat seriously interfere with the work that is
taking place within it.
Service (Dec. 9 2004), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/
permits/hcp/pdf/AdverseModGuidance.pdf.
101. See Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 20,421, 20,422 (May 4, 2009) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) (reversing
amendments made to several of the definitions by the previous administration
just a few months earlier—neither administration’s amendments to section
402.02 addressed the definitions for jeopardy or adverse modification as had
been urgently needed for so long).
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Also, note the addition of “any portion” to the adverse
modification regulation. This prevents the very dangerous
problem of framing the question as one of whether an action
appreciably diminishes the value of all of a species’ critical
habitat, rather than just the action area. It is possible for an
action to completely destroy a portion of critical habitat,
rendering it useless for recovery, without appreciably
diminishing the value of the whole, if the whole is much
larger. This would allow the chipping away of critical
habitat little by little, which is contrary to the purpose of
the ESA.
C. Returning to the Baseline Method for Analyzing the
Economic Impact of Critical Habitat Designations
Once we have clarity with regard to the two levels of
protection, especially as to the fact that they differ, the
baseline method is the natural choice for analyzing the
economic impact of critical habitat designations. It is
entirely inappropriate to consider any economic impacts
that would exist absent the designation. As such, I propose
that the agencies publish a formal policy of returning to the
baseline method once the new regulations are in place. This
will put a stop to the inconsistency we have seen in this
area, and thus lead to greater fairness in the designations
from species to species.
D. One More Problem: Implementation Sequence
There is one more very serious concern raised by what I
have proposed in this article. If we accept the view that
critical habitat is the place for recovery and that once we
are protecting it as such we can accept a lower standard for
jeopardy, what happens to all those listed species that have
no critical habitat designated for them? There is nothing in
place to protect their efforts at recovery, given that
Congress placed that responsibility in the hands of critical
habitat. This is not a sufficient reason not to move to a
holistic approach to the statute as proposed above, but does
require special consideration in the short term.
Two steps are needed to resolve this problem, which
stems from the decades of nonimplementation of the ESA.
First, the Services need to request a temporary special
appropriation of funds for the sole purpose of designating
habitat for the species already listed but lacking critical
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habitat. This should not be done in lieu of the Services’
other ESA responsibilities such as new listings, but rather a
special task force needs to be created to get this done.
Second, and in the meantime, listed species lacking critical
habitat must receive special consideration in jeopardy
consultations. In the event that a proposed project is to take
place on land likely to be designated as critical habitat, it
should be protected as if it were already sodesignated, at
least until the actual designation can be determined.
CONCLUSION
The ESA is a complex machine with many moving
parts, and this has caused more confusion than necessary. If
we look at it more carefully, we see that Congress designed
all these parts to work together and complement each other.
We do not need to interpret every single provision as being
a proactive step to recovery, but we do need to implement
the critical habitat provisions as such, because Congress
designed the statute to work that way. If we interpret the
ESA holistically, instead of piece by piece, we see how it all
works together. Critical habitat must be designated at the
time of listing, as it is the primary conservation tool for
listed species. It then must be protected as such. In
considering the economic impact of such designations, we
must look at the difference between what is achieved on the
critical habitat (recovery) and the lesser protections
afforded listed species generally. This is the complete
package Congress gave to wildlife decades ago, and it is
time for its delivery.

